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Abstract
This paper analyzes three contrasting strategies for modeling intentional agency in 
contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action, and draws parallels between 
them and similar strategies of scientific model-construction. Gricean modeling 
involves identifying primitive building blocks of intentional agency, and building 
up from such building blocks to prototypically agential behaviors. Analogical mod-
eling is based on picking out an exemplary type of intentional agency, which is used 
as a model for other agential types. Theoretical modeling involves reasoning about 
intentional agency in terms of some domain-general framework of lawlike regulari-
ties, which involves no detailed reference to particular building blocks or exemplars 
of intentional agency (although it may involve coarse-grained or heuristic reference 
to some of them). Given the contrasting procedural approaches that they employ and 
the different types of knowledge that they embody, the three strategies are argued to 
provide mutually complementary perspectives on intentional agency.
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1 Introduction
This paper distinguishes three contrasting methodological strategies for modeling 
intentional agency in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action.1 The 
three strategies have all been used previously, and I will provide examples of each of 
them from the literature. However, they have not been previously analyzed as alter-
native strategies, which possess their own distinctive constraints and affordances, by 
means of which models of intentional agency can be constructed. Rather, they have 
been understood as common manifestations of a more or less univocal philosophical 
practice of conceptual analysis (Jackson, 1998; King, 2016). By contrast to this tra-
ditional approach, I will argue that much like the theoretical modeling of other com-
plex phenomena in science, such as climate change (Lenhard & Winsberg, 2010; 
Parker, 2006) or disease epidemics (e.g. Kermack & McKendrick, 1927; Shiller, 
2017) may benefit from the use of multiple complementary modeling strategies, 
also philosophers can also make use of several different methodological strategies 
for modeling intentional agency.2 These strategies may serve different theoretical 
goals to varying degrees of satisfaction, they may be more or less amenable to dif-
ferent types of targets, and they may complement (or sometimes, compete with) one 
another in our overall effort to come to terms with intentional agency. Thus philo-
sophical research on intentional agency will be argued to resemble scientific mode-
ling in some important respects, where different strategies of model-construction are 
used to capture different aspects of the causal structure of the world, and to respond 
to different theoretical goals and concerns (see Godfrey-Smith, 2006a; Weisberg, 
2013).
The model-based methodological approach of this paper bears a similarity to 
meta-theoretical views that have been advanced during recent years in other domains 
of philosophical investigation, such as metaphysics (Godfrey-Smith, 2006b; Paul, 
2012), epistemology (Williamson, 2017) and (certain parts of) the philosophy of 
mind (Godfrey-Smith, 2005; Maibom, 2003). For example, Williamson (2017) 
understands formal work on epistemic logic (especially in the Bayesian tradition) as 
model-construction, while Godfrey-Smith (2006b) casts David Lewis’s (1986) work 
2 For example, the types of fine-grained details about the nature of perceptual processes that are germane 
to philosophical discussions of qualia and consciousness (e.g. Bermudez 2018; Noë 2004) do not seem 
to be as important for the causal understanding and explanation of overt forms of behavior (e.g. Bratman, 
1987; Dretske, 1988; Mele, 2009).
1 The notion of intentional agency is not one that I will attempt to define explicitly here, partly because 
of dangers of circularity that easily emerge in reductive definitions of this notion. The idea of performing 
purposive, or goal-directed actions is arguably central to intentional agency, and this seems to require 
that the notion of having intentional states (e.g. goals) is understood prior to understanding intentional 
agency. Many philosophers also take a kind of rational unity of perspective to be central to intentional 
agency, and have appealed to such unity to argue that certain kinds of aggregates of individuals (e.g. 
organized social groups) can be treated as agents in their own right (e.g. List & Pettit, 2011; Rovane, 
1998). In this paper, I will not take a stance on whether rational unity of perspective is required for inten-
tional agency, or whether some types of social groups ought to be recognized as agents. However, my 
approach is consistent with the idea that different definitions of agency may be appropriate to different 
types of philosophical investigation.
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on possible worlds and Humean supervenience as theoretical modeling. However, 
by contrast to these earlier contributions, my primary concern in this paper is with 
contrasting strategies of model-construction, rather than with the meta-theoretical 
status of philosophical accounts (of intentional agency) as theoretical models. To be 
clear, my claims in this paper are restricted to the methodology of model-construc-
tion, and I do not claim that philosophical research on intentional agency is similar 
to scientific research in all respects. For example, philosophical investigation rarely 
involves empirical experimentation (although it sometimes does—see e.g. Knobe & 
Nichols, 2008; Michael & Szigeti, 2019), and philosophers tend to rely in their exer-
cises of model-construction more on conceptual intuitions related to what Sellars 
(1963) called the manifest image of the world than modelers in other branches of sci-
ence. This being said, I will argue that the parallels between philosophical research 
on intentional agency and scientific modeling are substantial enough to force us to 
substantially revise our conception of philosophical methodology in this domain of 
investigation. In particular, I will argue that a model-based perspective supports a 
much more pluralistic and pragmatic approach to the philosophy of mind and action 
than is the mainstream today.
My perspective on model-construction in science is informed by recent natural-
istic approaches to the philosophy of science, which treat model-construction as 
one important, but not the only kind of theoretical activity that scientists engage in 
(Downes, 2011; Frigg & Hartman, 2012; Giere, 1988; Godfrey-Smith, 2006a; Haus-
man, 2012; Mäki, 2009; van Fraassen, 1980; Weisberg, 2013). According to many 
accounts, scientific modeling can be distinguished from other strategies of scien-
tific theorizing by its mediated character (see esp. Godfrey-Smith, 2006a; Weisberg, 
2007a). Instead of studying the world directly, by means of observation and experi-
mentation, scientific modelers study the world indirectly, by first studying a model 
and then formulating theoretical hypotheses (Giere, 1988) about how (if at all) the 
world may be similar to the model in question.3 The indirect nature of model-based 
science makes it possible for scientists to study phenomena, which could not eas-
ily be studied empirically because of causal complexity, epistemic opacity or rarity 
in nature. For example, social scientists have studied urban segregation with agent-
based models (Schelling, 1978) and biologists have constructed models of three-sex 
mating to understand what constraints sexual dimorphism poses on the evolution of 
species (Fisher, 1930; Weisberg, 2013, pp. 131–134). There are many different kinds 
of models in science, from the concrete models exemplified by model organisms and 
scale models, to agent-based models and computer simulations, and to the abstract 
mathematical frameworks of ecology and rational choice theory (Downes, 2011; 
Frigg and Hartman, 2012). These different models exploit contrasting conceptual 
3 According to Weisberg (2007a, pp. 209–210),””Modeling… is the indirect theoretical investigation of 
a real world phenomenon using a model. This happens in three stages. In the first stage, a theorist con-
structs a model. In the second, she analyzes, refines, and further articulates the properties and dynamics 
of the model. Finally, in the third stage, she assesses the relationship between the model and the world 
if such an assessment is appropriate. If the model is sufficiently similar to the world, then the analysis of 
the model is also, indirectly, an analysis of the properties of the real-world phenomenon. Hence mode-
ling involves indirect representation and analysis of real-world phenomena via the mediation of models.”.
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and explanatory resources, and make contrasting assumptions about the phenomena, 
which they are concerned with.
This paper will discuss models of intentional agency that are constructed by phi-
losophers for the purposes of understanding and explaining (particular forms of) 
purposive behavior.4 There is an important and often recognized continuity between 
such philosophical models of intentional agency and the “folk psychological” mod-
els that ordinary people use to make sense of each other’s intentional activities 
(Godfrey-Smith, 2005; Lewis, 1972; Maibom, 2003; Menzies, 2010; Sellars, 1963). 
This continuity is in part attributable to the fact that many philosophers of mind and 
action work by way of systematic elaboration and elucidation of folk psychological 
concepts and categories, which are used as raw material for the more regimented 
action-theoretic frameworks that they construct. However, an increasing number of 
philosophers have during recent decades also drawn on various types of extended 
resources from empirical and theoretical science, such as cognitive psychology (e.g. 
Bermudez, 2018; Mele, 2009; Noë, 2004) and decision theory (e.g. Bradley, 2017; 
Jeffrey, 1983). Thus the continuity between philosophical research on intentional 
agency and scientific model-construction seems worth exploring in its own right. 
This paper will explore such continuities, and their relation to traditional approaches 
(based on conceptual analysis) to the philosophy of mind and action.
To use an apt spatial metaphor, we may describe the three strategies that I will 
discuss as approaching the complex phenomenon of intentional agency from dif-
ferent directions. The research strategy that I will describe as Gricean modeling 
involves a “bottom-up” construction of the phenomenon of intentional agency 
from its constituent, primitive parts. The research strategy of analogical modeling 
involves a “horizontal” shift between two or more categories of presumptive agents. 
And the research strategy of theoretical modeling involves a “top-down” application 
of some suitably abstract and domain-general theoretical framework to the domain 
of agential behavior. The three strategies also embody different types of knowledge. 
Gricean modeling involves an engineer’s knowledge by opening the black box of 
the mind to reveal how each primitive building block of intentional agency contrib-
utes to the purposive behaviors of an agential system. Analogical modeling is typi-
cally based on (propositionally expressed) knowledge by acquaintance of familiar 
kinds of intentional agents and their possible structural similarities with other agen-
tial types. And theoretical modeling embodies a theoretician’s knowledge of abstract 
theoretical generalizations that are applicable to an open-ended domain of agential 
phenomena. Given the different methodological strategies that they employ and the 
different types of knowledge that they embody, I will argue that the three strategies 
complement one another in our overall goal to understand intentional agency.
4 Some representative examples of the kind of work that I have in mind are Bratman (1987, 1999, 2014), 
Harman (1986), Mele (2009), Searle (1983), Tuomela (2013), and Velleman (2009). Unfortunately, I will 
not be able to discuss their substantive views of intentional agency in detail, as my primary concern 
is with procedural differences between different strategies of model-construction, not with the types of 
models that have been produced by these strategies.
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Taken together, the three strategies can be seen to constitute a comprehensive, 
“neo-Gricean” (I will explain the reasons for this label in the next section) frame-
work for modeling intentional agency in contemporary philosophy of mind and 
action. However, some caveats about the scope of this paper are also in order. First, 
I recognize that there are further strategies for reasoning about intentional agency 
in philosophical contexts, including ones that do not draw on a distinctive strategy 
of model-construction at all—for example, ones based on phenomenological intro-
spection (e.g. Dreyfus, 2007; Schmid, 2014; cf. Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008, pp. 
153–171). Second, various amalgams of the three strategies may exist, and some 
philosophers may use several of the three strategies in parallel, without necessarily 
being aware of their important procedural differences.5 Third, I will focus on philo-
sophical issues that relate to the causal understanding and explanation of intentional 
agency, and I will largely sidestep issues about the normative justification of actions 
that arise in the context of moral and political philosophy (although such issues 
would be worth a more extensive treatment on their own). Fourth, I will also leave 
for another occasion discussion of model-based interdisciplinary exchanges (Grüne-
Yanoff & Mäki, 2014) between philosophy and other disciplines, which are con-
cerned with intentional action and agency, such as decision theory (Binmore, 2009; 
Gintis, 2009; Hausman, 2012) and social and developmental psychology (Carpen-
ter & Svetlova, 2017; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Rakoczy, 2017; Tomasello, 2019). 
With these caveats in mind, I am confident that the methodological framework that 
I will articulate is sufficiently comprehensive to support an important kind of meth-
odological pluralism in the philosophy of mind and action.
The first section of this paper is concerned with the bottom-up research strategy 
of Gricean modeling. After introducing Grice’s seminal methodological program 
and the contrast that he drew between model-construction and conceptual analysis, 
I will discuss its relation to rational interpretation, conceptual engineering, and (by 
extension) the use of simulation methods in science. In the second section, I will 
turn to the “horizontal” research strategy of analogical modeling, using research on 
analogical inference in cognitive science to analyze the tacit principles underlying 
this methodological strategy, and passages from Raimo Tuomela’s work on group 
agency to illustrate its use in the philosophy of mind and action. In the third section, 
I will discuss the top-down research strategy of theoretical modeling by reference to 
the Lotka-Volterra model of predator–prey interactions in ecology and the research 
program of common sense (or “analytic”) functionalism in the philosophy of mind 
and action. At the end of the paper, I draw together my conclusions, and indicate 
how they support a pragmatic and pluralistic approach to the philosophy of mind 
and action.
5 For example, Raimo Tuomela, whose work on group agency I will use to illustrate analogical mod-
eling, arguably also uses other strategies of model-construction.
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2  Gricean modeling
The methodological framework for modeling intentional agency formulated in 
this paper is called neo-Gricean, because Paul Grice (1974–1975) was arguably 
the first contemporary philosopher to suggest a model-based approach to the phi-
losophy of mind and action. However, Grice’s methodological ideas were far 
ahead of their time with respect to the philosophical landscape that he occupied, 
as there was little discussion of model-construction as a distinctive strategy of 
scientific investigation (see Godfrey-Smith, 2006a; Weisberg, 2007a, 2007b) at 
the time when he was writing. Perhaps for this reason, they have remained little 
explored to this day. The goal of this section of my paper is to excavate the largely 
forgotten insights of Grice’s methodological program, and to use them as a foun-
dation for constructing the extended neo-Gricean framework that I will formulate 
in this paper. However, my primary aim is not to carry out an exegetical study 
of Grice’s philosophy—rather I will interpret Grice’s methodological contribu-
tions liberally, drawing a number of parallels between it and certain strategies of 
model-construction that are used in contemporary science, and defending a type 
of methodological pluralism in the philosophy of mind and action that Grice did 
not explicitly argue for (see e.g. Grice, 1974–1975, pp. 36–37). This being said, it 
is useful to begin by considering how Grice (1974–1975) introduced his seminal 
methodological program in his Presidential Address to the 49th Annual Meeting 
of the American Philosophical Association:
One procedure, which I do not in the least despise, would be to take as a 
body of data our linguistic intuitions concerning what we would or would 
not be prepared to say when using psychological terms… I am, for various 
reasons, not happy to confine myself to these methods… The method which 
I should like to apply is to construct (in imagination, of course), according 
to certain principles of construction, a type of creature, or rather a sequence 
of types of creature, to serve as a model (or models) for actual creatures.. 
My creatures I call pirots… The general idea is to develop sequentially the 
psychological theory for different brands of pirot, and to compare what one 
thus generates with the psychological concepts we apply to suitably related 
actual creatures, and when inadequacies appear, to go back to the drawing-
board to extend or emend the construction (which of course is unlikely ever 
to be more than partial). (Grice, 1974–1975, p. 37)
The passage presents model-construction as an alternative to conceptual analysis, 
as it was practiced in the context of analytic philosophy of mind and action at the 
time when Grice was writing. What was the methodological contrast that he had 
in mind? The reference that Grice made to the use of “linguistic intuitions con-
cerning what we would or would not be prepared to say when using psychological 
terms” suggests that he took the methods of ordinary language philosophy (which 
was by that time waning in influence) as the primary foil for his methodological 
proposal. As is well known, Grice was a vocal critic of ordinary language phi-
losophy as a comprehensive research program, although he was acutely aware of 
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the significance of ordinary thought and talk for many domains of philosophi-
cal discourse (Grice, 1989; Neale, 1992). Thus Grice’s contributions to the phi-
losophy of mind and action were an extension of broader ideas that animated his 
philosophical thought.
The tradition of ordinary language philosophy has today been discredited in many 
domains of philosophical investigation (Forguson, 2001). However, some vestiges of 
the type of approach that it exemplified still seem to play a role in contemporary phi-
losophy of mind and action. For example, an ordinary language philosopher might 
have argued that the concept of belief is such that one would not be warranted to say 
that one believes what one does not take to be true. Today, it is still not uncommon 
to hear philosophers appeal to linguistic intuitions about what it means for an action 
to be “intentional”, for an agent to act “intentionally”, or for a mental state to be an 
“intention” (see O’Brien, 2015). Of course, there may well be a role for such lin-
guistic intuitions in philosophical investigation, if they are appropriately harnessed, 
and subjected to suitable criticism and revision (Cappelen, 2018; Machery, 2017). 
However, by questioning the authority of conceptual intuitions as the privileged 
means of reasoning about intentional agency in philosophy, Grice’s methodological 
program was far ahead of its time, and still has lasting appeal.
The central problem in relying on conceptual intuitions in many domains of 
philosophical investigation has to do with the inherently conservative and indeci-
sive nature of our conceptual intuitions about many issues of philosophical impor-
tance (see Grice 1974–1975, p. 36). In particular, many of our intuitions about cen-
tral action-theoretic concepts, such as the concept of acting intentionally, are vague 
or applied in a context-sensitive manner depending on the circumstances in which 
they are used (Godfrey-Smith, 2005)—for example, depending on whether our con-
cern is with predicting action or with attributing responsibility (Knobe, 2010), or 
whether we are talking about (more or less) fully socialized human individuals or 
about less “paradigmatic” agents, such as non-human animals, pre-linguistic infants, 
or group agents (Michael & Szigeti, 2019). Due to its concern with departing from 
vague and conservative philosophical intuitions, Grice’s methodological approach 
can be seen to bear an affinity to recent approaches to philosophical methodology, 
which describe philosophical practice in terms of conceptual engineering of new 
or revised concepts, rather than in terms of (conservative) conceptual analysis of 
the “essential” meanings of existing concepts (Cappelen, 2018; Machery, 2017; cf. 
Grice, 1974–1975, p. 38). Given this contemporary perspective on philosophical 
practice, which can be traced back to Carnap’s (1950) account of conceptual expli-
cation, philosophical analysis (understood as conceptual engineering) may arguably 
sometimes serve as one important means of constructing (propositional) models of 
intentional agency, rather than an alternative to it. However, conceptual intuitions 
should be granted at most a heuristic and defeasible role in the process of model-
construction, whose results are ultimately justified by their pragmatic or theoretical 
usefulness in representing particular types of agents.
The methodological alternative to conservative conceptual analysis that Grice 
proposed was itself partially based on the ideal of an engineering science (Grice used 
the metaphors of a “genitor” and an “engineer” working together and posing mutu-
ally complementary goals and constraints on the process of model-construction). 
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The modus operandi of his program of creature construction was the recognition 
of specific adaptive challenges coming from the environment of simple imaginary 
agents (which he called “pirots” or “operants”) and the step-by-step construction 
of appropriate psychological capacities providing adequate behavioral responses to 
such challenges. This resulted in a sequence or “hierarchy” of psychological types 
of increasing complexity, each building upon (and going beyond) the capacities 
of their ancestors in the sequence of pirot-types. While Grice placed human-like 
or “rational” creatures at the top his hierarchy, this was a function of the specific 
questions that he wanted to address, rather than an expression of anthropomorphic 
prejudice or narrow-mindedness—if Grice’s goal had been to understand how dif-
ferent types of creatures (perhaps amoebas or crustaceans) could have emerged 
from a gradual succession of smaller steps, he would have constructed an alterna-
tive sequence of pirot-types, with different properties exhibited by the creatures at 
the top of his hierarchy. This is how Grice characterized the principles of creature 
construction:
…The mode of construction is to be thought of as being relative to some very 
generally framed ‘living-condition’ concerning the relation of a pirot to its 
environment; the operations the capacity for which determines the type of the 
pirot are to be those which, given the posited condition, constitute the mini-
mum which the pirot would require in order to optimize the chances of his 
remaining in a condition to perform just those operations. I have in mind such 
a sequence as operants which don’t need to move at all to absorb sources of 
energy, operants which only have to make posture changes, operants which, 
because the sources are not constantly abundant, have to locate those sources, 
and (probably a good deal later in the sequence), operants who are maximally 
equipped to cope with an indefinite variety of physiologically tolerable envi-
ronments (i.e., perhaps, rational pirots).
The goal of Grice’s program was to understand actual creatures by creating an imag-
inary process that imitated selective aspects of the historical and evolutionary pro-
cesses that had produced them. Although his procedure was in many ways abstract 
and idealized relative to actual processes of evolution by natural selection, it can be 
seen to have included the three features of variation, transmission and differential 
fitness, which are required for evolution to take place (Lewontin, 1970). First, his 
pirots were endowed with different adaptations to the changing environment in order 
to ensure their survival. Then these adaptations were passed on to the next genera-
tion of pirot, who inherited the core features of their psychology from their ancestors 
in the lineage of pirot-types. Finally, each generation of pirots was placed in an envi-
ronment with other pirot types, who competed for scarce resources for sustenance 
and reproduction. Of course, Grice’s creatures did not emerge over historical time, 
and Grice imposed more order on his sequence of pirot-types than could be located 
in the often erratic (Jacob, 1977) and sometimes saltatory (Gould, 2002) process 
of natural selection. These abstractions and idealizations were warranted, because 
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Grice’s primary goal was to understand the actual creatures that had been produced 
by evolution by natural selection, rather than to reproduce all details of the historical 
and evolutionary processes that had produced them.6
By extension, we may identify an affinity between Grice’s methodological pro-
gram and the use of simulation methods in contemporary science (Macleod & 
Nersessian, 2017). A sequence of creatures resembling Grice’s pirots might in prin-
ciple be produced by a computer simulation, in which successive generations of 
pirots would co-evolve together with increasingly complex environments (populated 
by other pirot-types) at each stage during which the simulation is run (cf. Gardner, 
1970; Wolfram, 2002). This “simulationist” interpretation of Grice’s program of 
creature construction brings to mind agent-based simulations in other disciplines, 
such as computer science and sociology, where artificial agents are endowed with 
simple behavioral rules, and the macro-level outputs that these rules can generate 
are then studied through simulations from contrasting initial conditions, with the 
possibility of subsequently adjusting the behavioral rules or the initial conditions 
so as to test out alternative trajectories through state-space (Epstein, 1999; Gard-
ner, 1970; Wolfram, 2002). For example, in Thomas Schelling’s (1978) well-known 
checkerboard model of racial segregation, agents have a mild preference for staying 
next to agents of their own type, and they move around on a two-dimensional grid 
depending on whether this preference is satisfied. According to many philosophers 
of science (e.g. Humphreys, 2004; Winsberg, 2003), the central epistemic benefit 
of such agent-based modeling is the possibility of simulating outcomes that are not 
derivable from theory alone and the possibility of surprise—for example, we might 
find out that strongly segregated “neighborhoods” can emerge despite the absence of 
any explicitly “racist” attitudes in the population (Schelling, 1978; Ylikoski, 2014). 
Of course, this simulationist interpretation of Grice’s methodological program goes 
beyond what can be extracted from his seminal writings dating back to the 1970s, as 
Grice was not in a position to anticipate the revolution in computational techniques 
that would come about in the following decades. However, given that a computa-
tional implementation of the process of creature construction would further insulate 
it from the types of conservative conceptual intuitions that Grice was suspicious of, 
I believe that it would have been congenial to his concerns.
The profound originality of Grice’s methodological program can be thrown into 
sharp relief by contrasting it with other approaches to the philosophy of mind and action 
of his time, which viewed the observer-dependent and language-relative interpretation 
6 More precisely, these can be understood as instances of what Weisberg (2007b, 640) calls Galilean 
idealization, which is “the practice of introducing distortions into theories with the goal of simplifying 
theories in order to make them computationally tractable”. Weisberg distinguishes Galilean idealization 
from multiple models idealization, which “is the practice of building multiple related but incompatible 
models, each of which makes distinct claims about the nature and causal structure giving rise to a phe-
nomenon” (Weisberg, 2007b, p. 645), and minimalist idealization, which “is the practice of constructing 
and studying theoretical models that include only the core causal factors which give rise to a phenom-
enon “ (Weisberg, 2007b, p. 642). While Weisberg distinguishes different types of idealization by their 
representational ideals, others have distinguished idealization from abstraction in terms of whether they 
distort the phenomena to be modeled by removing irrelevant features (abstraction) or by misrepresenting 
the features that are included in the model (idealization) (e.g. Thomson-Jones, 2005).
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of behavior “as intentional” as the central principle guiding all philosophical investi-
gations of action and agency (Anscombe, 1958; Davidson, 1980; von Wright, 1971). 
Giving voice to this view, Donald Davidson (1973) wrote in his hallmark essay Radi-
cal Interpretation that “if we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other 
behaviour of a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our 
standards, we have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having beliefs, or as 
saying anything”. By contrast to Davidson’s (1980) principle of charity, which seem-
ingly forced all purposive behavior to be interpreted as rational as a matter of the logic 
of intentional explanation alone, Grice’s methodological program allowed for a spe-
cific type of engineering failure, if the psychological capacities that his creatures were 
endowed with failed to perform the functions that were designed for them. The meas-
ure of success was not rationality or irrationality but survival or extinction: for Grice, 
it was preferable to let nature (or his highly idealized simulacrum of nature) run its 
course, instead of attempting to dictate by conceptual intuitions alone how the products 
of its essentially random design ought to act and behave. Grice’s methodology of crea-
ture construction was a philosophy of action for the twenty-first century, although its 
seeds were sown far before its truly revolutionary character could be fully appreciated.
The impact of Grice’s program of creature construction on subsequent research 
in the philosophy of mind and action has been surprisingly limited, given the origi-
nality of his methodological insights. We may conjecture that at least three reasons 
have contributed to this  regrettable oversight. First, as already pointed out above, 
there was little discussion of model-construction as a distinctive strategy of scien-
tific investigation (Godfrey-Smith, 2006a; Weisberg, 2007a) at the time when Grice 
was writing, although models were discussed in the rather different set-theoretic 
sense of Suppes (1960) and Tarski (1953). Second, Grice made limited use of the 
methodological ideas that he presented in his own research, as it was the philoso-
phy of language, rather than the philosophy of mind and action, which was his pri-
mary field of inquiry (Neale, 1992). Third, the central ideas of Grice’s methodologi-
cal program were rather densely formulated in a little explored part of his corpus, 
which was dotted with informal commentary on contemporaneous philosophical 
issues, which are challenging for anyone but the most ardent student of the history 
of analytical philosophy to appreciate (I have interpreted Grice’s methodology liber-
ally, and connected it to many issues in contemporary philosophical and scientific 
methodology, which were not central topics of debate at the time when Grice was 
writing). However, some philosophers, notably Michael Bratman (1987, 2014) have 
made extensive use of a Gricean methodology, testifying to the lasting significance 
of Grice’s methodological ideas in contemporary philosophy of mind and action. I 
will return to Bratman’s use of creature construction at the end of this paper.
3  Analogical modeling
The notion of analogy can be distinguished from the closely related notions of simi-
larity (which it is an instance of) and metaphor (which is special case of analogy) by 
its emphasis on structural rather than material resemblance (Goldstone & Son, 2012; 
Holyoak, 2012; Gentner & Maravilla, 2018). Typical analogies follow the A:B::C:D 
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pattern (A is to B like C is to D), where the relational similarity between the two 
pairs may be masked by superficial similarity on the level of object correspondence 
(e.g. a dog chasing a man is analogous to a man chasing a dog, with the role of the 
chaser being played by the man in one scenario and the dog in the other scenario). 
To consider a famous analogy in the history of science, sound and water can be 
thought of as analogous phenomena, because they share a number of similar struc-
tural properties, such as “propagating across space with diminishing intensity, pass-
ing around small barriers, [and] rebounding off of large barriers” (Holyoak, 2012, 
234). They are in this sense analogous phenomena, although sound and water are 
materially different in a number of respects—for example, water is wet, while sound 
is not. This is how Holyoak (2012, p. 234) characterizes analogical thinking:
Two situations are analogous if they share a common pattern of relationships 
among their constituent elements, even though the elements themselves differ 
across the two situations… Typically one analog, termed the source or base, 
is more familiar or better understood than the second analog, termed the tar-
get…. This asymmetry in initial knowledge provides the basis for analogical 
transfer—using the source to generate inferences about the target. (Holyoak, 
2012, p. 234)
The inferential principles underlying analogical reasoning can be further elucidated 
in terms of the structure-mapping theory of Dedre Gentner (1983a, b; Gentner & 
Maravilla, 2018). According to Gentner, three central principles guiding analogical 
inference are the preservation of relationships, systematicity and one-to-one corre-
spondence. According to the preservation of relationships, information about rela-
tions between objects (e.g. electrons revolve around the nucleus like planets revolve 
around the sun) is preferentially processed over information about object attributes 
(e.g. the sun is yellow). According to the systematicity principle, more coherent and 
mutually constraining relations (e.g. distance, attractive force, being more massive 
than and revolving around a heavier body in the case of the Bohr model of the atom) 
are preferentially processed over relations that exhibit a lesser degree of systematic-
ity (e.g. being hotter than). According to one-to-one correspondence, each (group 
of) element(s) in the source analog corresponds to one (group of) element(s) in the 
target analog (e.g. electrons are the planets and the sun is the nucleus). In addition 
to these three structural principles, the disposition to engage in analogical reasoning 
has also been shown to depend on the goals of the reasoner (Dunbar, 2001; Holyoak 
& Thagard, 1997; Spellman & Holyoak, 1996) and on context, including the fram-
ing of the task and prior training in laboratory experiments (Markman & Gentner, 
1993).
The process of analogical reasoning can often be usefully thought of as proceed-
ing in stages (Gentner & Maravilla, 2018; Gentner & Smith, 2012; Holyoak, 2012). 
Four of the most important stages in analogical reasoning are retrieval of the source 
and target analogs, structural mapping between the source and the target, evaluation 
of the posited structural correspondence, and learning from analogy. In the retrieval 
stage, the source analog (e.g. the solar system) and the target analog (e.g. the struc-
ture of the atom) are brought to working memory. While this may seem relatively 
trivial when explicitly instructed what the source and the target are, the crucial stage 
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in solving new problems is often finding an appropriate, previously unexplored 
source analogy (Dunbar, 2001; Gick & Holyoak, 1980).7 In the mapping stage, each 
(group of) element(s) in the source analog is aligned with a corresponding (group 
of) elements in the target analog (e.g. the electrons as the planets and the nucleus 
as the sun). At this stage, one may also need to pay attention to negative analo-
gies, or ways in which the source system and the target system are dissimilar, and 
neutral analogies, or ways in which possible similarity between the source and the 
target system is left open for further investigation (Hesse, 1966). In the evaluation 
stage, one assesses whether the analogy has been successful, or whether some parts 
of the posited structural correspondence fail to hold. If the analogy is perceived as 
unsuccessful, one may attempt to fix the analogy by re-calibrating the elements in 
the source analog and the target analog or by selecting a different source analog, or 
one may give up the enterprise of analogical modeling altogether in favor of some 
alternative theoretical approach. To the extent that the analogy is the analogy is per-
ceived as successful, one can use it to draw further (defeasible) inferences about 
the target system. Typically, evaluating the correctness of a posited analogy involves 
empirical investigation.
The potential to learn from analogical inference is often the most important 
rationale for using analogical modeling in scientific contexts (Bailer-Jones, 2008; 
Gilboa et al. 2014; Haig, 2013; Niiniluoto, 1988), although analogical thinking in 
naturalistic settings is sometimes intuitive or automatic (Dunbar, 2001; Holyoak 
& Thagard, 1997). Research in cognitive science has shown that analogical think-
ing can be especially useful when confronted with novel problems and in the early 
and creative stages of scientific discovery (Gentner, 2002; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; 
Nersessian, 1999). This is because analogical reasoning generates alternative sys-
tems of hypotheses about the general principles governing the behavior of a system. 
Crucially, such hypotheses come in the form of structured knowledge concerning 
properties, which are known to co-occur in systems that are (by hypothesis) structur-
ally similar to the target phenomenon. Tapping into such structured knowledge has 
an obvious advantage in terms of speed and efficiency over attempting to formulate 
hypotheses about the behavior of the target system from scratch, without a struc-
tured analogy to draw upon (Holyoak & Thagard, 1997). Thus analogical modeling 
can often be both more economical and more productive than other strategies of 
model-construction, especially when our knowledge of the target system is poor or 
incomplete.
The role of analogies in science has been especially prominent during times of 
conceptual change, when a new scientific paradigm or theory is about to replace an 
existing one (Gentner, 2002; Nersessian, 1999; Thagard, 1992).8 Dramatic concep-
tual (and ultimately empirical) revolutions in science were facilitated by analogies 
7 For example, in Gick’s and Holyoak’s (1980) study, students were aided in their reasoning about how 
to cure a cancerous tumor when they had an analogous story about a group of soldiers surrounding a 
castle to draw upon (to cure the cancer without killing the patient, the tumor had to be zapped with weak 
rays from multiple directions instead of a single high-intensity ray).
8 Some philosophers (e.g. Levy & Currie,  2015) have suggested that all scientific modeling involves 
analogical thinking in the sense of evaluating similarity relationships between a model and the world (see 
also Giere, 1988). My concern in this section is with analogical reasoning in the process of model-con-
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between sound and water waves, the behavior of gases and billiard balls in motion, 
natural selection and artificial selection, and the mind and a computer. Of course, 
not all analogies ultimately turn out to be successful. For example, the wave analogy 
of sound, which was already discovered in Antiquity, turned out to be enormously 
productive by pointing to a range of appropriate structural similarities between 
sound and water waves. By contrast, the rival particle analogy of sound was eventu-
ally rejected as unfeasible (Holyoak, 2012, p. 235). In addition to their role in scien-
tific discovery and conceptual change, analogies can also sometimes play an impor-
tant role in theory confirmation and testing. For example, use of model organisms 
in biology and medicine seems to rely on the analogical inference that if a model 
organism (e.g. a mouse) responds in a certain manner to an experimental interven-
tion (e.g. vaccination), also the relevant target organism (e.g. humans) will respond 
in a similar manner (Ankeny & Leonelli, 2011; Nelson, 2018; cf. Levy & Currie, 
2016). This type of analogical inference can be made more reliable by empirical 
knowledge concerning physiological mechanisms underlying analogical responses 
in the two organisms (Bechtel & Richardson, 2010; Craver & Darden, 2013; Glen-
nan, 2017; Machamer et al. 2000).
The process of analogical reasoning has not often been discussed as an explicit 
and systematic strategy of philosophical investigation. To be sure, many philoso-
phers have used analogical reasoning in their argumentation, as when Wittgen-
stein (1953) drew an analogy between the rules of language use and the rules of a 
game, and Austin (1962) drew an analogy between speech acts and physical acts. 
Moreover, many famous philosophical thought experiments, such as John Searle’s 
(1980) Chinese Room -argument and Ned Block’s (1978) Nation of China -argu-
ment against causal role functionalism, seem to rely on analogical thinking. How-
ever, philosophers have rarely made explicit the inferential principles that analogical 
reasoning relies upon (however, see Niiniluoto, 1988). This may be because many 
philosophers continue to think of analogies as little more than spurious and informal 
aids to reasoning (Hempel, 1965, pp. 433–439; cf. Hesse, 1963), which may func-
tion at best in the “context of discovery”, rather than in the “context of justification” 
(Reichenbach, 1938). Accordingly, most philosophers tend to shy away from mak-
ing it explicit when they are using analogical reasoning in their investigation.9 One 
refreshing exception to this tendency can be found in Raimo Tuomela’s work on 
group agency:
The idea of a group agent can be based on an intuitive analogy: Analogously 
to intentional action (or at least a central kind of singular intentional action) by 
an individual agent, intentional action by a group agent… is normally based 
9 The simulationist approach to folk psychology might be offered as a counterexample to this tendency. 
However, in simulation theory it is ordinary folk psychological “mentalizers” (i.e. the targets of phil-
osophical investigation), rather than philosophers themselves, who are using analogical inference. See 
Goldman (2008).
struction, rather than with analogical thinking in the evaluation of the model-to-world relationship. Even 
if all scientific modeling involves analogical thinking, not all models are constructed by way of analogies.
Footnote 8 (continued)
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on reasons for action. Analogously to an individual having to coordinate the 
movements of her body parts… the members of a (we-mode) group coordinate 
their action… both synchronically and diachronically in order to achieve group 
goals. Analogously to an individual agent who is committed to her intended 
actions, the group members are committed as a group… to the group’s actions. 
Let us also assume along with common sense that at least some groups… can 
intentionally perform actions (e.g., a business company buys another one). 
This intuitive analogy… tells us that if a we-mode group acts as a group, its 
members in general… must act in the we-mode, for a group only acts through 
its members; and if the group acts in the we-mode, this means that a substan-
tial amount of we-mode acting by the members occurs. (Tuomela, 2013, p. 34)
This passage occurs in the context of Tuomela’s we-mode account of group agents, 
according to which group agency is supervenient on the we-mode mental states 
of its members. Tuomela (2013, Ch. 2) distinguishes we-mode mental states from 
mental states in the individualistic I-mode by three criteria, which he calls group 
reasons, collective commitment, and the collectivity condition. According to group 
reasons, we-mode group members are assumed to give up their private reasons 
and motives in the group context, and to take their reasons for action from what 
the group believes, desires and intends (Tuomela, 2013, pp. 38–40). According to 
collective commitment, we-mode group members are assumed to think and act as 
the group requires, and to be accountable to the other group members for perform-
ing their parts of the group’s activities (Tuomela, 2013, pp. 40–43). According to 
the collectivity condition, the group’s goals and other attitudes can, on conceptually 
necessary grounds, be satisfied for any group member if and only if they are satisfied 
for all of the group’s members (Tuomela, 2013, pp. 43–46).10
The preceding passage can be analyzed in terms of the four stages of analogical 
reasoning that were discussed above. In the retrieval stage, Tuomela brings up the 
source analog of individuals and the target analog of group agents. In the mapping 
stage, Tuomela maps information about the relations that (he takes to) hold between 
the notions of reason, coordination and commitment from the source analog of indi-
vidual agents to the target analog of group agents. In the evaluation stage, Tuomela 
infers that both individuals and “we-mode” social groups can be treated as inten-
tional agents, even if they are materially different in many respects—for example, 
individuals have proprietary bodies, while social groups do not. And in the learning 
stage, Tuomela goes on to draw a number of further inferences about the nature of 
group agency on the basis of the posited analogy. For example, Tuomela (2013, pp. 
51–53) argues that we-mode group agents can act autonomously and be held mor-
ally responsible for their actions. Thus Tuomela’s analogy view of group agents goes 
through the four stages of analogy retrieval, structural alignment, evaluation, and 
learning from analogy.
10 For more discussion of Tuomela’s philosophical ideas, see Corlett and Strobel (2017); Heinonen 
(2013); Preyer and Peter (2017).
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Tuomela does not claim that individuals and group agents are analogous in all 
respects. For example, Tuomela (2013, p. 23) refers to negative analogies between 
individuals and groups agents when he points out that “individual mental states are 
generally intrinsically intentional in virtue of their biological nature, whereas group 
agents are intentional only in a derived, extrinsic sense in virtue of their members’ 
collective construction of the group as an intentional entity that they identify with”. 
Tuomela (ibid.) also points out that his we-mode account of group agents “leaves 
out important conceptual and factual features of agency, such as phenomenal fea-
tures (e.g., qualitative sensations) and emotions, which belong to full-blown human 
agency”. Tuomela (ibid.) illustrates this point by saying that that “bodiless group 
agents do not blush when ashamed, although their members may take part in col-
lective guilt or pride and in similar shared emotions in the we-mode”. Given these 
and other relevant disanalogies, Tuomela (ibid.) ultimately contends that “groups 
can never be full-blown agents (or persons) in the flesh-and-blood sense, but at best 
entities that share some similar functional features with intentional human agents”.
There are also numerous other examples of analogical reasoning in the philoso-
phy of mind and action. One salient example is the analogy between a mind and 
a computer, which has been influential both in philosophy (e.g. Fodor, 1987; cf. 
Searle, 1980) as well as in the behavioral and cognitive sciences. For example, in the 
control-systems tradition in cybernetics (e.g. Ashby, 1957; Miller et al. 1960), the 
mind was viewed as an input–output machine, with distinctive (perceptual) inputs, 
computational (inferential) rules operating on those inputs, and (behavioral) outputs. 
The circular organization of goal, perception, and action was taken to govern the 
behavior of an intentional system in a manner that is analogous to the way in which 
changes in ambient temperature govern the behavior of simple mechanical systems, 
such as a thermostats (e.g. switching the radiator on or off depending on whether the 
ambient temperature is in the desired interval). The analogy between the mind and a 
computer had a profound impact on the development of cognitive science during the 
twentieth century, where the mind was framed not as a particular type of substance 
in the world (as in the Cartesian tradition) but in terms of the distinctive types of 
operations that it performs. While recent philosophers of cognitive (neuro-)science 
have challenged the idea that the mind can be studied independently of its material 
basis (e.g. Boone & Piccinini, 2016; Turner, 2018), the analogy between the mind 
and a computer provided the basis for an enormously fruitful research program in 
cognitive science during much of the twentieth century. This example accordingly 
illustrates how new and innovative analogies can initiate “conceptual revolutions” 
(Thagard, 1992), which serve an agenda-setting role for an entire scientific field or 
discipline.
4  Theoretical modeling
Theoretical models in science are often contrasted with concrete models and scale 
models, such as an airplane wing in a wind tunnel, a scaled down map of a certain 
geographical region, or a model organism (Downes, 2011; Frigg & Hartman, 2012). 
However, the primary feature that sets apart theoretical modeling in the sense that 
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I am concerned with in this article is its procedural character (cf. Godfrey-Smith, 
2006a; Weisberg, 2013). Theoretical modeling involves reasoning about the laws 
and regularities that are associated with a particular domain of phenomena without 
detailed reference to either particular entities that populate that domain (as in ana-
logical modeling) or particular mechanisms that maintain those laws and regulari-
ties (as in Gricean modeling). Theoretical modeling typically also involves a kind of 
top-down and holistic approach in the sense that the relevant laws and regularities 
are characterized in interdependent terms. For example, the notions of force, mass 
and acceleration are characterized in an interdependent manner by Newton’s laws 
of motion (Giere, 1988). Here, I will first discuss the research strategy of theoretical 
modeling in general terms, before illustrating its use in the philosophy of mind and 
action by the research program of common sense (or “analytic”) functionalism.
Theoretical modeling can in part be distinguished from the two other modeling 
strategies that I have discussed by its abstract and domain-general nature. However, 
what counts as sufficiently domain-general is to some extent relative to the type of 
phenomena that one attempts to explain. For example, physical models of simple 
harmonic motion have been applied to a wide range of different physical systems 
exhibiting oscillatory behavior, such as swinging pendulums, bouncing springs, and 
vibrating strings (Giere, 1988). Ecological models of predator–prey interactions 
have been applied to many different populations of predator and prey occupying the 
same ecosystems, such as sharks and squid in the Mediterranean and lynx and hare 
in Canada (Weisberg, 2013). And economic models of rational choice have been 
applied to a wide variety of systems that exhibit choice-behavior, such as individu-
als, time-slices of individuals, households, and business corporations (Hausman, 
2012; Ross, 2010; Varian, 2010). For the philosophy of mind and action, the rel-
evant domain is the domain of intentional agents, who can be described as having 
representational states, such as beliefs and desires, and as acting on their basis (Den-
nett, 1987).
The most important procedural difference that sets apart theoretical modeling 
from Gricean modeling and analogical modeling is its reliance on derivational 
techniques, although theoretical models need not be formulated in terms of math-
ematical equations (in addition, they may also involve e.g. predicate logic or other 
methods of linguistic derivation). Theoretical modeling involves deriving a set of 
quantities and/or propositions representing a phenomenon from a body of generali-
zations (or laws) governing the domain of phenomena that it belongs to. For exam-
ple, general equilibrium theory in economics involves deriving the equilibrium price 
for a good from general regularities governing supply and demand, such as profit 
maximization, diminishing marginal utility, and the law of one price (Hausman, 
1992). However, price determination in markets can also be modeled by the tools of 
agent-based models, for example, by simulations relating consumer behavior to the 
perceived rate of inflation, consumers’ state of optimism about the future, or simple 
decision-making heuristics (e.g. pick the most familiar product) (Foley & Farmer, 
2009). Adopting this type of bottom-up approach can lead to different predictions 
than the analytically derived outcomes predicted by general equilibrium theory, 
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The domain-general character of theoretical modeling can in many circum-
stances be regarded as an epistemic virtue, given that it allows us to unify a 
broad range of different phenomena under a common set of laws and regularities. 
However, one must typically sacrifice some attention to detail in order to con-
struct a theoretical model that is highly general and broadly applicable (Matthew-
son & Weisberg, 2009). Thus there is no generally applicable reason to regard 
either a more top-down or more bottom-up approach to model-construction as 
more appropriate in all circumstances. Rather, different approaches to model-
construction involve contrasting trade-offs between precision, domain-general-
ity, and empirical accuracy, which may be more or less appropriate depending 
on the interests of the modeler and the target phenomena that they are used to 
study (Levins, 1966; Weisberg, 2013). To illustrate, consider a simple version 
of the Lotka-Volterra model of predator–prey interactions discussed in Weisberg 
(2007a, p. 210):
The equations represent the dynamic relationship between a predator and prey 
population as a function of time (t) and the size of the predator (V) and prey (P) 
population, the intrinsic birth rates of the two populations (r for predator and b for 
prey) and the intrinsic death rates of the populations (m for predator and a for prey). 
This simple model is in many respects abstract and idealized (Matthewson & Weis-
berg, 2009). For example, it considers only two populations and does not take into 
account population structure or alternative sources of food for the predators. Despite 
these abstractions and idealizations, it allows us to get a handle on some of the cru-
cial parameters governing periodic oscillations in particular predator and prey popu-
lations in particular environments. For example, the model was used to explain the 
unexpected depletion of certain prey populations in the Adriatic Sea after World 
War II, when many fishermen expected population sizes to have increased as a result 
of the wartime decrease in commercial fishing (Weisberg, 2007a).
Theoretical modeling in the philosophy of mind and action can be exemplified 
by the research program of common sense (or “analytic”) functionalism. While 
common sense functionalism was traditionally described as making explicit 
a tacit “theory of the mind” (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Lewis, 1972; Sellars, 
1963), common sense functionalism can also be described as involving theoreti-
cal modeling and model-construction, because it involves indirect representation 
of agents through general law-like regularities connecting mental states to behav-
ior (Godfrey-Smith, 2006). These regularities involve many abstractions and ide-
alizations relative to the behavior of actual agents—for example, actual agents 
may fail to draw the logical consequences of their beliefs, although the require-
ment of logical coherence is included (for reasons of tractability) in many models 
of intentional agency that are based on common sense functionalism (cf. Harman, 
1986). The seeds of the research program of common sense functionalism were 
initially sown by the seminal investigations of Wilfrid Sellars (1963), and they 
dV∕dt = rV−(aV)P
dP∕dt = b(aV)P−mP
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were later formalized using the Ramsey sentence method in predicate logic by 
David Lewis (1972). In a classic textbook, David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank 
Jackson distil it in the following terms:
“What then is a given mental state M, on the common-sense functionalist 
story? It is the state that plays the M role in the network of interconnections 
delivered by common knowledge about the mind. The network in effect identi-
fies a role for each mental state, and thus, according to it, a mental state is sim-
ply the state that occupies the role definitive of it. The situation is similar to 
that which applies when we elucidate our concept of being a bank teller. There 
is a network of interconnections between inputs involving customers entering 
the bank, outputs involving loans approved and cash handed over, and internal 
connections between tellers, accountants, managers, and the like. What then 
is a teller? Anyone who occupies the relevant role in the network.” (Braddon-
Mitchell & Jackson, 2007, pp. 53-54)
Common sense functionalism exemplifies the type of top-down and holistic approach 
that is characteristic of theoretical modeling, as it identifies the functional roles that 
are played by each type of mental state by the entire network of generalizations in 
which it figures in “common knowledge of the mind” (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 
2007, pp. 52–53; see also Lewis, 1972). Common sense functionalists typically take 
our common knowledge of the mind to be paradigmatically expressed in natural lan-
guage, and to be manifested in linguistic platitudes such as “bodily damage causes 
pain”, “desire for beer causes behaviour that leads to beer consumption”, and “belief 
that if p then q typically causes belief that q on learning p” (see Braddon-Mitchell 
& Jackson, 2007, p. 52). Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (ibid.) classify these types 
of platitudes into three broad categories (originally identified by Sellars, 1963; see 
also Searle, 1983): world-to-mind regularities, which describe the causal influence 
that the world has on mental states, mind-to-world regularities, which describe how 
mental states cause bodily behaviors, and mind-to-mind regularities, which express 
internal interconnections between different types of mental states.
Common sense functionalism is in part motivated by the search for generality and 
wide scope that are characteristic of the research strategy of theoretical modeling. 
Thus Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (2007, pp. 49–52) regard as one of the main 
benefits of the (common sense) functionalist approach that it allows for the multi-
ple realizability of mental states by different physical substrates and thereby avoids 
“chauvinism” about intentional agency. For example, the operations that are charac-
teristic of the mental state of ‘believing that someone is standing behind the door’ 
might be carried out by one set of physiological states in dogs, by another set of 
states in humans, and by a third set of states in intelligent robots. Accordingly, many 
philosophers, who draw on a common sense functionalist approach to intentional 
agency (e.g. List & Pettit, 2011; Pettit, 1996), have made a point of arguing that even 
physically quite different types of systems, including many animals, simple robots 
and even some social groups, can be described as intentional agents with beliefs 
and desires from “the intentional stance” (Dennett, 1987). This is because common 
sense functionalists argue that as long as a system exhibits behavioral regularities 
7021
1 3
Synthese (2021) 199:7003–7030 
that are characteristic of intentional agency, then it counts as an agent, regardless of 
its physical make-up or the nature of the mechanisms underlying its operations.11
The common sense functionalist approach to intentional agency has been chal-
lenged by some philosophers, who have argued that our common knowledge of the 
mind is not structured around the types of law-like generalizations about behavior 
identified by common sense functionalists. For example, simulation theorists have 
provided evidence that much of our understanding of other people’s mental life is 
based on our capacity to use our own decision-making system as a physical model 
of the decision-making systems of other agents (Goldman, 2008). Maibom (2003) 
argues that our ordinary framework of intentional agency is structured around 
abstract theoretical models, rather than quasi-universal generalizations with implicit 
ceteris paribus -clauses. Hutto (2008) emphasizes the narrative aspects of folk psy-
chological action understanding against the kinds of reductive belief-desire explana-
tions favored by many common sense functionalists. And David Velleman (2009) 
capitalizes on the second-order desire for self-understanding, which builds upon the 
causal regularities identified by basic forms of common sense functionalism.
These criticisms indicate that the scope of common sense functionalism is likely 
to be more limited than many philosophers educated by Braddon-Mitchell’s and 
Jackson’s (2007) classic textbook may have assumed. However, the mistake is sim-
ply to take common sense functionalism as the privileged methodological frame-
work for modeling intentional agency in the philosophy of mind and action, as there 
are surely more resources for action understanding that both ordinary people and 
philosophers may use. For example, Godfrey-Smith (2005) describes folk psychol-
ogy as a family of models, which individuals can use flexibly in the pursuit of a wide 
variety of different theoretical and practical goals.
...It is possible that a basic part of our psychological apparatus is a facility for 
what we might call model-based understanding. This skill involves the imagi-
nary construction of simplified structures for the purpose of understanding 
more complex systems. If there is such an ability, the products of some kinds 
of folk theorizing might have important features in common with models in 
the scientific sense, and both of these may contrast with some more traditional 
philosophical notions of theory. Further, once we recognize the possibility 
of model-based understanding—in this sense—as a distinctive psychological 
capacity that operates both inside and outside of scientific contexts, we can 
note that folk psychology could have model-like features that are not very sci-
ence-like.
The heterogeneity and context-specificity of folk psychological models has 
important repercussions for how internally unified we should consider the types 
11 This view is expressed in an exceptionally vivid manner by Pettit (1996, p. 10): “There are regularities 
characteristic of beliefs and desires, regularities that dictate both the effect of certain sort of evidence on 
what beliefs and desires are maintained, and the effect of certain sorts of belief–desire profiles on what 
responses are evinced… A system will count as an intentional agent to the extent that its interactions 
with its environment, or at least some of its interactions, are governed by such regularities.”.
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of knowledge delivered by common sense functionalism to be. For example, 
Godfrey-Smith (2005) argues that many deeply ingrained debates about real-
ism and instrumentalism in the philosophy of mind and action can be framed 
in terms of contrasting ontological construals of folk psychology. While both 
Churchland’s (1981) eliminativism and Fodor’s (1987) “industry-strength” real-
ism are premised on the idea that the ontological commitments of folk psychol-
ogy are to be taken quite literally—despite drawing opposing conclusions about 
the usefulness of folk psychology from the presumption of realism— Dennett 
(1987) emphasizes the pragmatic uses of folk psychology at the expense of its 
ontological commitments. According to Godfrey-Smith (2005), the ontologi-
cal and conceptual commitments of folk psychological notions can be adjusted 
flexibly depending on the circumstances in which they are used and the agents 
whose behaviors they are used to model. For example, the condition of logical 
closure (i.e. that agents be capable of inferring all the logical consequences of 
their beliefs) may seem appropriate for some cases of explicit belief-reasoning 
in grown-up human agents, e.g. when solving a puzzle, but this condition would 
hardly seem inappropriate in the case of one’s pet dog wagging its tail in the 
belief that its owner is behind the door. Godfrey-Smith (2005) argues that these 
contrasting uses of the term ‘belief’ do not simply involve different notions of 
belief (e.g. ‘beliefs*’ and ‘beliefs**’) since the criteria for attributing such men-
tal states can be highly sensitive to context, and consequently, one would end 
up with an indefinite variety of different notions of ‘belief’. The domain-general 
and deductive approach of common sense functionalism seeks to abstract away 
from such context-specific and pragmatic features in the pursuit of a compre-
hensive and internally unified framework (see e.g. Lewis, 1972, p. 256). Thus 
it cannot provide the whole story about how we come to understand intentional 
agency, even if it successfully captures certain types of linguistically scaffolded 
reasoning about intentional agency (cf. Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).
There is a close connection between the types of folk psychological models 
that ordinary people use in their daily lives and the more regimented models 
of intentional agency that philosophers of mind and action have constructed for 
understanding and explaining intentional agency, as already noted in the intro-
duction to this paper. In one sense, the extended neo-Gricean framework for 
modeling intentional agency that I have formulated can be viewed as an exten-
sion of Godfrey-Smith’s important insights about the pluralistic and pragmatic 
nature of folk psychological knowledge. While Godfrey-Smith (2005) argued 
that the type of folk psychological apparatus that ordinary people use for pre-
dicting, understanding and explaining one another’s intentional activities is 
made up of a family of models, rather than a single, internally unified theoretical 
framework, I have argued in this paper that philosophers can use many different 
methodological strategies for modeling intentional agency, just like the ordinary 
agents, whose behaviors they seek to model. In the next section, I will indicate 
how the three strategies that I have discussed complement one another in our 
overall goal to understand and explain (different forms of) intentional agency.
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5  Understanding agency by modeling
This paper has analyzed three strategies for modeling intentional agency in the 
philosophy of mind and action. The tacit principles underlying these strategies 
have been exposed, they have been illustrated with examples from the philosophi-
cal literature, and they have been connected to similar modeling strategies in sci-
ence. While Paul Grice (1974–1975) can be credited with first articulating the 
idea of model-construction as a serious alternative to the once dominant enter-
prises of (conservative) conceptual analysis and rational interpretation, both 
Grice and his followers considered only one, distinctively bottom-up form of 
model-construction. By contrast, I have gone beyond Grice’s seminal contribu-
tions by arguing that there are in fact several different strategies of model-con-
struction, which philosophers of mind and action can use in their research. In this 
concluding section of my paper, I will indicate how the three strategies can be 
used in parallel to support a more pluralistic and pragmatic approach to the phi-
losophy of mind and action than has previously been available.
To begin, I will summarize the central features of the three modeling strate-
gies. The research strategy of Gricean modeling is based on identifying primitive 
building blocks of intentional agency, and building up from such basic building 
blocks to more complex agential behaviors (Grice, 1974–1975). Its bottom-up 
approach, which can be seen to bear an affinity to the program of conceptual 
engineering in contemporary philosophical methodology and the use of simula-
tion methods in science, aims at an engineer’s knowledge by opening the “black 
box” of the mind to investigate how each primitive building block of intentional 
agency contributes to the goal-directed behaviors of an agential system. The 
research strategy of analogical modeling is based on picking out some exem-
plary type of intentional agency, which is used as a model for other, structurally 
similar agential types. Its “horizontal” approach, which reminds us of the use of 
model organisms in biology and the role of analogies during times of concep-
tual change, embodies (propositionally expressed) knowledge by acquaintance of 
familiar agential types and their (possible) structural similarities with other types 
of agents. The research strategy of theoretical modeling is based on reasoning 
about intentional agency in terms of a domain-general network of law-like regu-
larities, which involves no detailed reference to either distinctive building blocks 
or exemplars of intentional agency (although it may involve coarse-grained or 
heuristic reference to some of them). Its top-down approach involves abstract 
theoretician’s knowledge of general principles applying to an open-ended domain 
of agential phenomena, resembling the use of abstract mathematical and prop-
ositional frameworks in disciplines, such as ecology and economics (Hausman, 
2012; Weisberg, 2007a, 2007b).
The research strategies of Gricean modeling, analogical modeling and theoret-
ical modeling can arguably play mutually complementary roles in the philosophy 
of mind and action. Consider the following timely parallel to science: a group of 
scientists studying the propagation of an incipient virus epidemic across a pop-
ulation might make use of abstract mathematical models in epidemiology, and 
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carry out experimental interventions on various types of model organisms, and 
use computational techniques such as agent-based modeling. Similarly, my sug-
gestion is that philosophers can use the strategies of Gricean modeling, analogi-
cal modeling, and theoretical modeling in parallel to focus on particular types or 
aspects of intentional agency, and to test the plausibility of the conclusions that 
they have drawn from a contrasting methodological perspective. This does not 
mean that the results of the three strategies must converge with one another, given 
that the procedural principles that they are based on may point in different direc-
tions, and it may sometimes be useful to have many different models of the same 
phenomenon (Levins, 1966; Weisberg, 2013, pp. 103–105; Wimsatt, 2007, Ch. 
6).12 However, when the three strategies do converge on similar conclusions, they 
can yield more compelling insights than any of the strategies taken in isolation.
To illustrate, consider the idea that the mind can be modeled in terms of (percep-
tual) inputs and (behavioral) outputs, as well as operations performed on internal 
mental representations. This idea has been supported by analogical reasoning com-
paring the mind to a computer (see Sect. 3), as well as a by bottom-up Gricean ideas 
about how a simple organism interacts with its environment, and top-down common 
sense functionalist ideas about the types of “world-to-mind”, “mind-to-mind”, and 
“mind-to-world” (Braddon-Mitchell & Jackson, 2007, p. 52; Sellars, 1963) regulari-
ties that have been taken to be implicit in our ordinary framework of agency. Thus 
it justifiably has a central place in most philosophical models of intentional agency, 
as it can be rationalized on the basis of numerous different strategies of model con-
struction. On the other hand, some assumptions that are involved in more cogni-
tively demanding functionalist models of intentional agency, such as the require-
ment of logical closure, may seem too demanding for bottom-up Gricean modelers, 
who prefer to construct models of complex agents from simple building blocks and 
to introduce more demanding features only when necessary. Thus Gricean model-
ers would prefer to relegate this feature to more advanced creatures in the Gricean 
hierarchy of agent-types, while they may still agree with functionalists that a certain 
type of responsiveness to evidence is a central feature of all mental states that can be 
described as ‘beliefs’.
The three strategies may also sometimes lead to different conclusions or play 
competing roles in our efforts to understand and explain intentional agency. For 
example, philosophers have offered different arguments for the reducibility or irre-
ducibility of group agency to individual agency depending on whether they have 
adopted a strategy of Gricean modeling, analogical modeling, or theoretical mode-
ling. Most philosophers, whose work can be described as involving forms of Gricean 
modeling, have been inclined to endorse reductionist accounts of group agents (e.g. 
Bratman, 2014, pp. 121–131). By contrast, philosophers making use of analogical 
12 For example, Weisberg (2007b, pp. 646–647) discusses the three different models of global circula-
tion patterns used by the US National Weather Service to forecast the weather, and rationalizes the use of 
multiple models by saying that”theorists have different goals for their representations, such as accuracy, 
precision, generality, and simplicity.. [which] can trade off with one another in certain circumstances, 
meaning that no single model can have all of these properties to the highest magnitude”.
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(e.g. Tuomela, 2013, 34–36) or theoretical strategies of model-construction (e.g. 
List & Pettit, 2011, pp. 31–41) have often been tempted to treat group agents as irre-
ducible to individual agents in at least some important respects. This being said, one 
should not draw too far-reaching conclusions about the reductionist bias of bottom-
up forms of model-construction or the anti-reductionist agenda of top-down forms 
of model-construction, since such deep philosophical disagreements are underdeter-
mined by the procedural differences that I have discussed in this article. For exam-
ple, consider the manner in which Michael Bratman (2014) describes the goals of 
Gricean creature construction:
The aim of creature construction is to understand more complex forms of 
agency by building step-wise from simpler forms of agency. We build more 
complex structures upon a foundation of simpler structures in ways that 
respond to identifiable problems and issues that arise in the context of those 
simpler structures. (Bratman, 2014, p. 25)
This description of the goals of creature construction may appear to mask a reduc-
tionist agenda. However, on a closer reading of Bratman’s research in the philosophy 
of action, it becomes evident that Bratman has used Gricean methodology in order 
to argue for both reductionist and anti-reductionist ideas. For example, in his early 
work on the belief-desire-intention (or BDI-)-framework in the philosophy of mind 
and action, Bratman (1987) defended the irreducibility of intentions as particular 
types of mental states against Humean accounts, which sought to analyze all forms 
of intentional agency in terms of the primitive building blocks of belief and desire 
(Davidson, 1980; Smith, 1994). By contrast, in his more recent work on shared 
agency, Bratman (1999, 2014) has argued against the necessity of appealing to irre-
ducible we-intentions (Searle, 2010; Tuomela, 2013) or joint commitments (Gilbert, 
2010) in the analysis of small-scale forms of shared agency in the absence of asym-
metric authority relations (which Bratman calls forms of modest sociality). Thus 
bottom-up modeling is not intrinsically and unavoidably reductionist, nor is top-
down modeling intrinsically and unavoidably anti-reductionist, although they may 
be more or less conducive to reductionist or anti-reductionist ideas depending on the 
types of agential phenomena that they are used to model and the types of theoretical 
contexts in which they are used (concerned e.g. with the prediction, explanation, or 
normative evaluation of agential phenomena).
The general lesson that we can draw from Bratman’s use of the methodology of 
creature construction is that one should not confuse the procedural strategies by 
means of which philosophical models of intentional agency are constructed with the 
substantive features of the models that are constructed by means of such strategies. 
My main concern in this paper has been with the methodology of model-construc-
tion, not with determining which philosophical model of intentional agency is the 
correct or most appropriate one (in any particular set of epistemic circumstances or 
relative to any particular category of agents). While we may conjecture that the pos-
sibility of multiple modeling strategies pointing in a similar direction may lead to the 
development of agential models that are in some sense more robust (Levins, 1966; 
Weisberg, 2006; Wimsatt, 1981; Woodward, 2006) than models that have been sup-
ported by an isolated strategy, the notion of robustness has itself been defined in 
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multiple different ways in the philosophy of science, and challenged by some phi-
losophers as a non-empirical form of confirmation (e.g. Odenbaugh & Alexandrova, 
2011; Orzack & Sober, 1993).13 Moreover, questions of robustness have to do pri-
marily with the evaluation of the model-to-world relationship, i.e. with evidence and 
realism, rather than with the methodology of model-construction. Accordingly, I 
will not discuss the topic of robustness in more detail in the present paper, although 
it is an interesting and important topic in its own right. For the same reason, I will 
also leave it open in this paper whether agency is something objective in the world 
or whether it is in the “eye of the beholder”, as some philosophers in the Wittgen-
steinian tradition have argued (e.g. Bennett & Hacker, 2003), and whether this raises 
issues that are similar to or different from issues of realism that relate to the exist-
ence of middle-sized physical objects, such as tables and chairs (as contrasted with 
the types of objects that are postulated by fundamental physics, such as quarks or 
electrons (Ladyman & Ross, 2007; Niiniluoto, 1999)).
There remain many opportunities for exploring further the connections that I have 
drawn between philosophical research on intentional agency and scientific model-
construction. However, I hope to have identified sufficient parallels between these 
fields of research to support an important kind of methodological pluralism in the 
philosophy of mind and action.
Acknowledgements This paper benefited from generous comments from Dr. Tuukka Kaidesoja and two 
anonymous referees for Synthese.
Funding Research funding was provided by a grant from the Emil Aaltonen Foundation. Open access 
funding provided by University of Helsinki including Helsinki University Central Hospital.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen 
ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Ankeny, R., & Leonelli, S. (2011). What’s so special about model organisms? Studies in the History and 
Philosophy of Science, 41, 313–323.
13 Eronen (2014) distinguishes between derivational robustness and robustness as multiple accessibil-
ity. Derivational robustness has to do with several different models with contrasting simplifying assump-
tions supporting the same conclusions, while robustness as multiple accessibility has to do with the same 
phenomenon being accessible by multiple different modalities (e.g. by the sensory modalities of vision, 
touch, and hearing). Woodward (2006) distinguishes between robustness as insensitivity of the results of 
inference to alternative specifications, robustness of derivations, robustness of measurement results, and 
robustness as a mark of causal as opposed to (merely) correlational relationships.
7027
1 3
Synthese (2021) 199:7003–7030 
Anscombe, E. (1958). Intention. Blackwell.
Apperly, I., & Butterfill, S. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? 
Psychological Review, 116(4), 953–970.
Ashby, W. (1956). An introduction to cybernetics. Chapman and Hall.
Austin, J. (1962). How to do things with words (2nd ed.). Harvard University Press.
Bailer-Jones, D. (2008). Models, metaphors, and analogies. In P. Machamer & M. Silberstein (Eds.), The 
Blackwell guide to the philosophy of science (pp. 108–127). Blackwell.
Bechtel, W., & Richardson, R. (2010). Discovering complexity: decomposition and localization as strate-
gies in scientific research. MIT Press.
Bennett, M., & Hacker, P. (2003). Philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Blackwell.
Bermudez, J. (2018). The bodily self. MIT Press.
Binmore, K. (2009). Rational decisions. Princeton University Press.
Black, M. (1962). Models and metaphors. Studies in language and philosophy. Cornell University Press.
Block, N. (1978). Troubles with functionalism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 9, 
261–325.
Boone, W., & Piccinini, G. (2016). The cognitive neuroscience revolution. Synthese, 193, 1509–1534.
Braddon-Mitchell, D., & Jackson, F. (2007). Philosophy of mind and cognition. An introduction (2nd 
ed.). Blackwell.
Bradley, R. (2017). Decision theory with a human face. Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M. (1987). Intention, plans, and practical reason. MIT Press.
Bratman, M. (1999). Faces of intention. Cambridge University Press.
Bratman, M. (2014). Shared agency: a planning theory of acting together. Oxford University Press.
Burgess, A., Cappelen, H., & Plunkett, D. (2020). Conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics. Oxford 
University Press.
Cappelen, H. (2018). Fixing language: an essay on conceptual engineering. Oxford University Press.
Carnap, R. (1950). Logical foundations of probability. University of Chicago Press.
Carpenter, M., & Svetlova, M. (2017). Social development. In B. Hopkins, E. Geangu, & S. Linkenauger 
(Eds.), Cambridge Encyclopedia of Child Development (pp. 415–423). Cambridge University 
Press.
Churchland, P. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 
78, 67–90.
Corlett, J., & Strobel, J. (2017). Raimo Tuomela’s social ontology. Social Epistemology, 31(6), 557–571.
Craver, C., & Darden, L. (2013). In search of mechanisms: discoveries across the life sciences. University 
of Chicago Press.
Davidson, D. (1973). Radical interpretation. Dialectica, 27, 314–328.
Davidson, D. (1980/2001). Essays on actions and events. 2nd Edition. Clarendon Press.
Dennett, D. (1987). The intentional stance. MIT Press.
Downes, S. (2011). Scientific models. Philosophy. Compass, 6(11), 757–764.
Dretske, F. (1988). Explaining behavior: reasons in a world of causes. MIT Press.
Dreyfus, H. (2007). The return of the myth of the mental. Inquiry, 50(4), 352–365.
Dunbar, K. (2001). The analogical paradox: why analogy is so easy in naturalistic settings, yet so difficult 
in the laboratory. In D. Gentner, K. Holyoak, & B. Kokinov. (Eds.), The analogical mind: perspec-
tives from cognitive science. MIT Press.
Epstein, J. (1999). Agent-based computational models and generative social science. Complexity, 4(5), 
41–60.
Eronen, M. (2015). Robustness and reality. Synthese, 192, 3961–3977.
Farmer, J., & Foley, D. (2009). The economy needs agent-based modelling. Nature, 460, 685–686.
Fisher, R. A. (1930). The genetical theory of natural selection. The Clarendon Press.
Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics. MIT Press.
Forguson, L. (2001). Oxford and the epidemic of ordinary language philosophy. The Monist, 84(3), 
325–345.
Frigg, R., & Hartmann, S. (2012). Models in Science. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 
2012 Edition. Edward N. Zalta (Ed.). URL = http:// plato. stanf ord. edu/ archi ves/ fall2 012/ entri es/ 
models- scien ce/
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2014). The phenomenological mind. Routledge.
Gardner, M. (1970). The fantastic combinations of John Conway’s new solitaire game ’Life’. Scientific 
American, 223, 120–123.
7028 Synthese (2021) 199:7003–7030
1 3
Gavetti, G., & Rivkin, J. (2005). How strategists really think: tapping the power of analogy. Harvard 
Business Review April (2005).
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping. A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science, 7, 
155–170.
Gentner, D. (2002). Analogy in scientific discovery: the case of Johannes Kepler. In L. Magnani & N. 
Nersessian (Eds.), model-based reasoning: science, technology, values (pp. 21–39). Kluwer.
Gentner, D., & Maravilla, F. (2018). Analogical reasoning. In L. J. Ball & V. Thompson (Eds.), Interna-
tional handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 186–203). Psychology Press.
Gentner, D., & Smith, L. (2012). Analogical reasoning. In V. S. Ramachandran (Ed.), Encyclopedia of 
Human Behavior (2nd ed., pp. 130–136). Academic Press.
Gick, M., & Holyoak, K. (1980). Analogical problem solving. Cognitive Psychology, 12, 306–355.
Giere, R. (1988). Explaining science: a cognitive approach. University of Chicago Press.
Giere, R. (2004). How models are used to represent reality. Philosophy of science, 71(5), 742–752.
Gilbert, M. (2013). Joint commitment: how we make the social world. Oxford University Press.
Gilboa, I., Postelwaite, A., Samuelson, L., & Schmeidler, D. (2014). Economic models as analogies. The 
Economic Journal, 124, 513–533.
Gintis, H. (2009). The bounds of reason. Princeton.
Glennan, S. (2017). The new mechanical philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Godfrey, S., & P. . (2006). The strategy of model-based science. Biology and Philosophy, 21(5), 725–740.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2005). Folk psychology as a model. Philosopher’s Imprint, 5(6), 1–16.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006). Theories and models in metaphysics. Harvard Review of Philosophy, 14, 4–19.
Goldman, A. (2008). Simulating minds. The philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. 
Oxford University Press.
Goldstone, R., & Son, J. (2012). Similarity. In K. Holyoak & R. Morrison (Eds.), The Oxford handbook 
of thinking and reasoning. Oxford University Press.
Gopnik, A. (1996). The scientist as child. Philosophy of Science, 63(4), 485–514.
Gopnik, A., & Meltzoff, A. (1997). Words, thoughts, theories. MA, MIT Press.
Gould, S. (2002). The structure of evolutionary theory. Harvard University Press.
Grice, H. P. (1989). Studies in the way of words. Harvard University Press.
Grice, H. P. (1974-1975). Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre. Proceed-
ings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 48, 23-53
Grüne-Yanoff, T., & Mäki, U. (2014). Introduction: interdisciplinary model-exchanges. Studies in History 
and Philosophy of Science Part A, 48, 52–59.
Haig, B. (2013). Analogical modeling: a strategy for developing theories in psychology. Frontiers in Psy-
chology, 4, 1–3.
Hakli, R., Miller, K., & Tuomela, R. (2011). Two kinds of we-reasoning. Economics and Philosophy, 26, 
291–320.
Harman, G. (1986). Change in view. Principles of reasoning. MIT Press.
Haslanger, S. (2000). Gender and race: (what) are they? (What) do we want them to be? Noûs, 34(1), 
31–55.
Hausman, D. (2012). Preference, value, choice, and welfare. Cambridge University Press.
Heinonen, M. (2013). Tuomela’s theory of the we-mode. In B. Kaldis (Ed.), Sage encyclopedia of phi-
losophy and the social sciences (pp. 1053–1057). Sage.
Hempel, C. (1965). Aspects of scientific explanation. The Free Press.
Hesse, M. (1966). Models and analogies in science. University of Notre Dame Press.
Hofstadter, D. (2001). Analogy as the core of cognition. In D. Gentner, K. Holyoak, & B. Kokinov (Eds.), 
The analogical mind: perspectives from cognitive science. MIT Press.
Holyoak, K. (2012). Analogy and relational reasoning. In K. Holyoak & R. Morrison (Eds.), The Oxford 
handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 234–259). Oxford University Press.
Holyoak, K., & Thagard, P. (1997). The analogical mind. American Psychologist, 52(1), 35–44.
Humphreys, P. (2004). Extending ourselves: computational science, empiricism, and scientific method. 
Oxford University Press.
Hutto, D. (2008). Folk psychological narratives. The sociocultural basis of understanding reasons. MIT 
Press.
Jackson, F. (1998). From metaphysics to ethics: a defense of conceptual analysis. Oxford University 
Press.
Jacob, F. (1977). Evolution and tinkering. Science, 196(4295), 1161–1165.
Jeffrey, R. (1983). The logic of decision (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.
7029
1 3
Synthese (2021) 199:7003–7030 
Kermack, W., & McKendrick, A. (1927). A contribution to the mathematical theory of epidemics. Proceed-
ings of the Royal Society of London, Series A, 115(772), 701–721.
King, J. (2016). Philosophical and conceptual analysis. In H. Cappelen, T. Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), 
The Oxford handbook of philosophical methodology (pp. 249–261). Oxford University Press.
Knobe, J. (2010). Person as scientist, person as moralist. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 315–365.
Knobe, J., & Nichols, S. (2008). Experimental philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Ladyman, J., & Ross, D. (2007). Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized. Oxford University Press.
Lenhard, J., & Winsberg, E. (2010). Holism, entrenchment, and the future of climate model pluralism. Stud-
ies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41, 253–262.
Levins, R. (1966). The strategy of model-building in population biology. American Scientist, 54(4), 421–431.
Levy, A., & Currie, G. (2015). Model organisms are not (theoretical) models. British Journal for the Philoso-
phy of Science, 66, 327–348.
Lewis, D. (1972). Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50, 
249–258.
Lewis, D. (1986). Philosophical papers (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press.
Lewontin, R. (1970). The units of selection. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 1, 1–18.
List, C., & Pettit, P. (2011). Group agents. The possibility, design and status of corporate agents. Oxford 
University Press.
Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67(1), 
1–25.
Machery, E. (2017). Philosophy within its proper bounds. Oxford Universiry Press.
Maibom, H. (2003). The mindreader and the scientist. Mind and Language, 18(3), 296–315.
Mäki, U. (2007). MISSing the world. Models as isolations and credible surrogate systems. Erkenntnis, 70, 
29–43.
Markman, A., & Gentner, D. (1993). Structural alignment during similarity comparisons. Cognitive Psychol-
ogy, 23, 431–467.
Matthewson, J., & Weisberg, M. (2009). The structure of tradeoffs in model-building. Synthese 170, 
169–190.
Mele, A. (2009). Effective intentions. Oxford University Press.
Menzies, P. (2010). Reasons and causes revisited. In M. de Caro, & D. Macarthur (Eds.), Naturalism and 
normativity, pp. 142–170. Columbia University Press.
Michael, J., & Szigeti, A. (2019). “The Group Knobe Effect”: evidence that people intuitively attribute 
agency and responsibility to groups. Philosophical explorations, 22(1), 44–61.
Miller, G., Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. (1960). Plans and the structure of behavior. Henry Holt.
Neale, S. (1992). Paul Grice and the philosophy of language. Linguistics and Philosophy, 15, 509–559.
Nelson, N. (2018). Model behavior: animal experiments, complexity, and the genetics of psychiatric disor-
ders. University of Chicago Press.
Nersessian, N. (1999). Model-based reasoning in conceptual change. In L. Magnani, N. Nersessian, & P. 
Thagard (Eds.), Model-based reasoning in scientific discovery. Kluwer.
Nersessian, N. (2002). In the theoretician’s laboratory. Thought experimenting as mental modeling. Philoso-
phy of Science, 2, 291–301.
Nersessian, N., & Macleod, M. (2017). Models and simulations. In L. Magnani & T. Bertolotti (Eds.), 
Springer handbook of model-based science (pp. 119–136). Springer.
Niiniluoto, I. (1988). Analogy and similarity in scientific reasoning. In D. Helman (Ed.), Analogical reason-
ing: perspectives of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, and philosophy (pp. 271–299). Kluwer.
Niiniluoto, I. (1999). Critical scientific realism. Oxford University Press.
Noë. Alva. . (2004). Action in perception. MIT Press.
O’Brien, L. (2015). Philosophy of action. Palgrave Macmillan.
Odenbaugh, J., & Alexandrova, A. (2011). Buyer beware: Robustness analyses in economics and biology. 
Biology & Philosophy, 26, 757–771.
Orzack, S. H., & Sober, E. (1993). A critical assessment of Levins’s the strategy of model building in popula-
tion biology (1966). The Quarterly Review of Biology, 68, 533–546.
Parker, W. (2006). Understanding pluralism in climate modeling. Foundations of Science, 11, 349–368.
Paul, L. (2012). Metaphysics as modeling: the handmaiden’s tale. Philosophical Studies, 160, 1–29.
Pettit, P. (1996). The common mind. An essay on psychology, society and politics. Oxford University Press.
Preyer, G., & Peter, G. (2017). Social ontology and collective intentionality. Critical essays on the philosophy 
of Raimo Tuomela with his responses. Springer.
Rakoczy, H. (2017). The development of individual and shared intentionality. In J. Kiverstein (Ed.), The 
Routledge handbook of the philosophy of the social mind (pp. 139–151). Routledge.
7030 Synthese (2021) 199:7003–7030
1 3
Reichenbach, H. (1938). Experience and prediction. An analysis of the foundations and the structure of 
knowledge. The University of Chicago Press.
Rodrik, D. (2015). Why economics works, when it fails, and how to tell the difference. Oxford University 
Press.
Ross, D. (2010). The economic agent: not human, but important. In U. Mäki (Ed.), Elsevier handbook of 
philosophy of science, vol. 13: economics. Elsevier.
Rovane, C. (1998). Bounds of agency. Princeton University Press.
Schelling, T. (1978). Micromotives and macrobehavior. W.V. Norton.
Schmid, H. (2014). Plural self-awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13, 7–24.
Searle, J. (1980). Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417–457.
Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge University Press.
Searle, J. (2010). Making the social world: the structure of human civilization. Oxford University Press.
Sellars, W. (1963). Science, perception and reality. Routledge.
Shiller, R. (2017). Narrative economics. American Economic Review, 107(4), 967–1004.
Simon, H. (1969). The sciences of the artificial (2nd ed.). MIT Press.
Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Blackwell.
Spellman, B., & Holyoak, K. (1992). If Saddam is Hitler then who is George Bush? Analogical mapping 
between systems of social roles. Journal of personality and social psychology, 62, 913–933.
Suppes, P. (1960). A comparison of the meaning and uses of models in mathematics and the formal sciences. 
Synthese, 12(2–3), 287–301.
Tarski, A. (1953). A general method in proofs of undecidability. In A. Tarski, A. Mostowski, & R. Robinson 
(Eds.), Undecidable theories. North Holland Publishing.
Thagard, P. (1992). Conceptual revolutions. Princeton University Press.
Thomson-Jones, M. (2005). Idealization and abstraction: a framework. In M. Thomson-Jones & N. Cart-
wright (Eds.), Idealization XII: correcting the model (pp. 173–217). Rodopi.
Tomasello, M. (2019). Becoming human: a theory of ontogeny. Harvard University Press.
Tuomela, R. (2013). Social ontology: collective intentionality and group agents. Oxford University Press.
Turner, S. (2018). Cognitive science and the social. Routledge.
Van Fraassen, B. (1980). The scientific image. Oxford University Press.
Varian, H. (2010). Intermediate microeconomics: a modern approach (8th ed.). W.V. Norton.
Velleman, D. (2009). How we get along. Cambridge University Press.
von Wright, G. H. (1971). Explanation and understanding. Routledge.
Weisberg, M. (2006). Robustness analysis. Philosophy of Science, 73, 730–742.
Weisberg, M. (2007a). Who is a modeler? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58, 207–233.
Weisberg, M. (2007b). Three kinds of idealization. The Journal of Philosophy, 104(12), 639–659.
Weisberg, M. (2013). Simulation and similarity: using models to understand the world. Oxford University 
Press.
Weisberg, M. (2016). Modeling. In H. Cappelen, T. Gendler, & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), The Oxford handbook 
of philosophical methodology (pp. 262–286). Oxford University Press.
Williamson, T. (2017). Model-building in philosophy. In R. Blackford & D. Broderick (Eds.), Philosophy’s 
future: the problem of philosophical progress (pp. 159–172). Wiley Blackwell.
Wimsatt, W. C. (1981). Robustness, reliability, and overdetermination. In M. Brewer & B. Collins (Eds.), 
Scientific inquiry and the social sciences (pp. 124–163). Jossey-Bass.
Winsberg, E. (2003). Simulated experiments: methodology for a virtual world. Philosophy of Science, 70, 
105–125.
Wittgenstein, L. (1953). Philosophical investigations. Blackwell.
Wolfram, S. (2002). A new kind of science. Wolfram Media.
Woodward, J. (2003). Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press.
Woodward, J. (2006). Some varieties of robustness. Journal of Economic Methodology, 13, 219–240.
Ylikoski, P. (2014). Agent-based simulation and sociological understanding. Perspectives on science, 22(3), 
318–335.
Publisher’s Note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
